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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

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## BIG THREE BICKERING MARKS UN MEMBERSHIP CONTROVERSY

WHEN the General Assembly, scheduled to meet on September 23, approves the Security Council's recommendation to admit Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden, the United Nations will total 54 members, 8 less than the League of Nations had at its peak. Were it not for the current diplomatic struggle between Russia and the West, five other applicants for admission to the United Nations would probably have been approved by the Security Council during its membership discussions in its new headquarters at Lake Success on August 28-29.

Siam, facing a French veto because of its prolonged territorial dispute with France over the Indo-Chinese border, had withdrawn its application before the Security Council discussions began. The remaining eight bids for membership, in the order of their presentation, were those of Albania, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic, Afghanistan, Transjordan, Eire, Portugal, Iceland and Sweden. To be recommended for membership by the Council, each applicant needed seven votes, including those of the Big Five. Since the Council's rules of procedure require that membership applications be approved twenty-five days before the meeting of the Assembly, the eleven Council members had to hold two long sessions, one of nearly seven hours on August 28, and another of more than eleven hours on August 29.

**NEW USE OF THE VETO.** When these exhausting meetings ended, Afghanistan, Iceland and Sweden had been approved with ten votes and no opposition. Ireland received nine votes, but was defeated by a Russian veto, as were Transjordan and Portugal which were given eight votes (Poland joined the Soviet Union in voting against the latter two). Of the other two rejected candidates, Mongolia obtained only six votes and Albania five. Since neither of these two Soviet protégés had the necessary seven

votes, the United States and Britain, which had joined the Netherlands in voting against them, were in a position to argue that technically they had not used the veto. Australia abstained from voting on all eight applications, arguing that the procedure of submitting membership applications to the Security Council before they go to the Assembly is wrong. Australia intends to raise this issue before the Assembly. France, Brazil and Mexico approved all eight candidates, while China abstained on the Albanian vote. China's approval of Mongolia was an interesting reversal of its earlier opposition to Mongolia's admission at this time.

The membership debate opened on a striking note—when Herschel V. Johnson, the United States delegate, introduced a resolution to admit all eight candidates without discussion. When this proposal was sharply attacked by Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Johnson withdrew it, serving notice however that he would thereafter vote against admission for Albania and Mongolia. The French delegate, Mr. Parodi, in keeping with France's characteristic rôle as a mediator in such disputes, suggested the admission of the three states on which there was general agreement, while postponing the decision on the other five till next year. But this resolution too, facing Soviet rejection, was withdrawn. An Egyptian proposal to vote on the candidates in their alphabetical order in English was also turned down. Since such a step would have brought the non-controversial Afghanistan candidacy up first, thus sparing the United States and Britain from starting out by rejecting the Albanian application, Mr. Gromyko pointedly inquired why the candidates should not be voted on according to the way their names appeared in Spanish or Chinese.

**PROCEDURAL SNARLS.** Procedural snarls on

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the following day continued to delay a final vote despite the fact that the results were a foregone conclusion. The membership committee of the Security Council had already reached the same deadlock after three weeks of discussion. Holding fourteen meetings between August 1 and August 21, this committee, on which each Council member was represented, finally decided to leave the problem to the Council itself.

The Soviet attitude was as much of a puzzle in the committee as it was in the Council. Not until the fourteenth and last meeting did Russia voice its approval on Iceland and Sweden. It was only over Soviet protest that the committee adopted resolutions to accept statements and ask questions about candidates' fitness for membership. In the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko aroused considerable annoyance by refusing to elaborate his reasons for opposing the applications of Transjordan, Eire and Portugal; he merely reiterated that the Soviet Union did not maintain diplomatic relations with those countries. On the other hand, the opponents of Russia's

candidates were inconsistent in questioning the independence of Albania and Mongolia while accepting that of Transjordan. If lack of "independence" excluded states from membership, the positions of Egypt, India, the Philippines, Syria and Lebanon, and the Byelo-Russian and Ukrainian Republics would also be questionable. According to the United Nations Charter an applicant need only be a peace-loving state, and be willing and able to fulfill its obligations as a member.

While the United States resolution to admit all eight applicants at once may be criticized as a bargaining device that violates the principle of weighing each application on its merits, it at least faced a difficult situation in a positive and practical way. Rejection of the five applicants is an indication of the stumbling blocks on the road toward universal membership in the United Nations. Mutual suspicions about the creation of rival blocs are leading the great powers to reject compromises that would be relatively easy to achieve in a more favorable political atmosphere.

VERNON MCKAY

## GREAT POWER RIVALRY MOUNTS IN GRECO-ALBANIAN DISPUTE

In Greece, ancient crossroads between the East and West, intense diplomatic rivalry between Russia and the western powers was renewed shortly before the plebiscite of September 1, when about 72 per cent of the ballots cast favored the recall of King George to the throne. If Greece is only a position, like Trieste or Iran, in the shifting lines of the Big Three political battle, it has become the object of strained attention in three widely separated parts of the world: at the Paris Conference, where the issue of Albania's admission in a consultative capacity was closely linked with the uneasy situation prevailing on the Greek-Albanian border; at Lake Success, where the Security Council on September 4 placed on its agenda the Ukrainian charge that Greece was seeking, with British support, to provoke war in the Balkans; and in the Aegean waters visited by an American naval force shortly after the referendum in a move interpreted as United States support of the *status quo* in Greece. Of all these external attempts to influence the decision in Greece, the diplomatic offensive mounted by Russia and its satellites against the only Balkan state upon the peninsula remaining outside the Soviet orbit was the most energetic.

GREEK BOUNDARIES UNDER REVIEW. Although the bitter dispute over Southern Albania, which the Greeks call northern Epirus, has been interpreted as reflecting on a smaller scale the great power struggle for control of the Adriatic Sea, actually the issue has been endemic in Greco-Albanian relations since the creation of the Albanian state shortly before World War I. Cession of southern Albania-northern Epirus, an area comprising one-fourth

of the entire territory of Albania and including the coast opposite the British-occupied base of Corfu, is demanded by Greece on strategic, historical and ethnographic grounds. On the latter point the Greek and Albanian population figures—apparently based on ancient and unreliable statistics in both cases—are widely divergent. The "ethnic frontier" demanded by Premier Tsaldaris on August 3 at the Paris Conference would place under the protection of the Greek flag the Eastern orthodox, Greek-speaking people of the disputed region who allegedly constitute the majority of the population and are now being "Albanized" by force, according to the Greek claim. If, moreover, the boundary were advanced some distance to the north, from a point west of Monastir (in Yugoslav territory) to the Adriatic coast north of Corfu, Greece would possess a naturally defensible frontier with Albania. The Athens government refers to Albania's declaration of war on Greece, when the latter was invaded by Italy in 1940, as evidence of the hostile intentions of its northern neighbor, with which it considers itself to be in a continuing state of war.

From the Albanian standpoint, on the other hand, northern Epirus is overwhelmingly Albanian in character—cradle both of the nationalist movement before the Balkan wars and of the resistance against the Axis. To maintain that the 120,000 to 125,000 Eastern Orthodox Christians who inhabit the area are Greeks is, in the Albanian view, no more logical than to argue that all Roman Catholics are Italian. Nor do Albanians consider it reasonable to judge their attitude toward Greece by the conduct of the Italian-trained Albanian army and that of the puppet

government installed in Tirana by Italy, after Italy had occupied the country on Good Friday 1939. They cite the fact that in 1941 Albanian Partisans assumed at great cost the task of liberating their country, in the course of which they gave material support to the invading Greek columns. The cession of southern Albania-northern Epirus, it is claimed, would force a truncated Albania to federate with Yugoslavia, and create additional problems for Greece.

**STRATEGIC INTERESTS INVOLVED.** Under the conditions prevailing today, it is unlikely that any solution to this border problem can be obtained that will do justice to the claims of the two small countries immediately concerned. The strategic stretch of Albanian coast, possession of which might neutralize the value of Trieste as an outlet to the Mediterranean, hangs in the international balance. Whenever a powerful state has arisen in

Italy it has attempted to expand into the Balkans by using Albania as a bridgehead; and, similarly, when a dominant power has been created in the Balkan peninsula it has tended to gain control of the Albanian littoral and, thus, of the Adriatic. Considerations of this nature led British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in 1942, while commending Albanian guerrillas for their underground activities, to reserve the question of the frontier with Greece for review at the peace settlement. At the same time, Russia has promoted Albania's claim, not only for membership in the United Nations but for representation in a "consultative capacity" at the Paris Conference as well. Friction between Greece and its northern neighbors will undoubtedly be intensified by the results of the plebiscite. As in the past, however, Balkan developments will faithfully mirror relations among the great powers themselves.

OLIVE HOLMES

## ISSUE OF ABILITY TO PAY RAISED IN PARIS REPARATIONS DEBATE

On September 2 the Conference of Paris learned that the British had filed a claim for reparations from Italy totalling \$11,520,000,000. This fantastic sum is almost double the amount demanded by the other United Nations (\$5,700,000,000). It was understood, however, that the British claim was a strategic move for the purpose of forcing the Italian Economic Commission of the Conference to apply the principle of capacity to pay in disposing of demands on Italy. London, moreover, was giving indirect support to a determined effort on the part of the Australian delegation to have all reparation issues reviewed by a permanent allied commission and decided on the basis of ability to pay. On August 28 and 30 the Australians sought to amend the clause in the Italian treaty giving Russia \$100 million in reparations; but each time their proposal was voted down, since the United States, Britain and France are committed to support the treaty provisions relating to Russia as agreed upon by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

**REPARATIONS MEASURED BY CAPACITY TO PAY.** Apart from its administrative features, the Australian recommendation does not differ much from the position taken all along by Secretary of State Byrnes in the Council meetings. Particularly with respect to Soviet claims on Italy, the United States has contended that the amount exacted should be related to capacity to pay. By applying this principle Mr. Byrnes finally succeeded in limiting the Italian reparation to Russia to \$100 million, with payments arranged in such a manner as to lessen the burden on the economy of Italy. He had cited the fact that the United States had already advanced directly or indirectly \$900 million "to enable the Italian nation to live." Obviously, he said, Italy was

in no position to pay large reparations. As to the claims of other United Nations, the Foreign Ministers left this to the conference for consideration and recommendations.

Although the United States has stressed ability to pay in fixing reparation claims, it has voiced disapproval of the other features of the Australian proposal. Speaking for the United States delegation before the conference's Economic Commission on the Balkans and Finland on August 28, when the Rumanian treaty was being considered, Dr. Willard L. Thorp stated that the Australian plan was not acceptable because it would delay final determination of the amount of reparations; moreover, in stipulating that payment be made in free foreign exchange, the scheme was not practical, given the present disordered state of world trade. As to Rus-

## RESIGNATION OF MISS LEET

The Board of Directors of the Foreign Policy Association announces with regret that Miss Dorothy F. Leet resigned as Secretary of the Association on August 31, 1946, to accept a position in another field of foreign relations.

Miss Leet has served the Association as General Secretary for over eight years, and in addition to administrative functions, has been especially interested in the Annual Forum and in the development of Branches of the Association, which have increased from seventeen to thirty-two.

Following her graduation from Barnard College, Miss Leet became a member of the administrative staff of that institution. She spent fourteen years in France as the Director of Reid Hall in Paris, and was decorated by the French government with the Legion of Honor "for furthering and strengthening intellectual relations between France and the United States and thereby increasing international understanding."

An announcement will be made in the near future in regard to new staff members.



sian claims on Rumania, he contended that it had not been shown that these were too burdensome. On that subject, however, his argument lacked force, since the Australian thesis was that without complete data on what the Soviet forces had taken in Rumania to date for occupation costs, booty, and restitution, no adequate assessment could be made of the treaty figure for reparations. In a strongly worded speech Mr. Molotov supplied a partial answer when he stated that Russia had so far collected \$86 million as reparations from Rumania. The Rumanian phase of the reparations question was not thereby disposed of, for on August 29 British and South African members of the Economic Commission raised the issue anew by citing the practice of Russia in taking as reparations the output of oil wells owned by British and other allied interests, and paying prices much below the world level. An amendment to require payment at a "fair price" was supported by the United States.

**ISSUE OF HUNGARIAN REPARATIONS.** The divergence between Russia and the Western powers on the economic clauses of the treaties will undoubtedly be most sharply revealed when the delegates take up the Hungarian treaty; for although the draft treaty allows Russia \$300 million in reparations (\$100 million of which will go to Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), the United States has reserved the right to reopen this question when it comes before the conference. Economic conditions in Hungary have deteriorated rapidly since the end of the war. This situation prompted the United States as early as December 1945 to propose that the Big Three, in accordance with the Crimea Declaration, jointly undertake a program of economic assistance for Hungary. The proposal was rejected by the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the United States on March 2, 1946 and again on July 23, addressed notes to Moscow citing the plight of Hungary, and attributing it to the burden of reparations, requisitions and occupation costs being exacted by Russia. In reply, Moscow categorically rejected the charges as being wholly unfounded. The Washington proposal for concerted Big Three action to promote Hungarian economic rehabilitation was likewise turned down by the Soviet Union on the ground that such a program would violate the sovereignty of the Hungarian government.

The contention that Russia has throttled economic recovery of the Danubian states has been made frequently; but only with respect to Hungary has the United States given any official support to the

charges, no doubt because in that country economic disorganization has no parallel elsewhere except in Germany. Hungary, however, occupies a central position in southeastern Europe, and its people have registered a surprisingly large vote against the Communist ticket. These factors may also have influenced Washington to make an issue of Russian policy in Hungary. Moreover, since Russian economic arrangements there closely parallel those in Bulgaria, Rumania, and the Soviet zone of Austria, the United States is in effect questioning the Moscow program in the entire Danubian region. When the Peace Conference takes up the reparations clause of the Hungarian treaty, the question of capacity to pay will be debated anew; but Moscow has so far given no indication that it will modify its insistence that Hungary be left to its own devices. The Hungarian government has recently adopted a new currency unit, as a result of which it should be able to effect some improvement in its economy.

HAROLD H. HUTCHESON

#### RESULT OF SPECIAL MEETING OF AUGUST 27th

At the special meeting of members of the Foreign Policy Association held on August 27th the amendment to the Constitution increasing the dues of Regular Members from \$5 to \$6 was adopted. Members in good standing on August 27th have the privilege of renewing their membership for one year at the old rate, if they so desire.

*The War: Fifth Year*, by Edgar McInnis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$2.50

This extremely useful series comprising chronology, text, maps and documentary appendix continues through September 30, 1944.

*The Germans in History*, by Prince Hubertus zu Loewenstein. New York, Columbia University Press, 1945. \$5.00

A Catholic and a long-time anti-Nazi, Prince Loewenstein has written an erudite interpretation of his view that the story of the Germans represents a struggle between opposite forces.

*World War: Its Cause and Cure*, by Lionel Curtis, New York, Oxford University Press, 1945. \$3.25

A distinguished British administrator suggests, somewhat unrealistically, a union in one government of Britain and the Dominions, which would ask European democracies and ultimately the United States to join.

*The Ciano Diaries*, by Count Galeazzo Ciano. New York, Doubleday, 1946. \$4.00

Fascinating revelation of the pretentious, shoddy structure of Fascism by one well-qualified to know its inner workings as Mussolini's son-in-law and Foreign Minister.

*The Story of the Second World War*, edited by Henry Steele Commager. Boston, Little, Brown, 1945. \$3.00

An interesting mélange of articles, war correspondent's stories, and official statements, held together by the editor's narrative, giving a vivid, episodic picture.

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